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Sept. 18, 1967.]

EDWARD J. FARLEY et al., Petitioners, v. BASIL
HEALEY, as Acting Registrar of Voters, et al., Respondents.
[1] Mandamus - Jurisdiction - Supreme Court. - The Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction in mandamus was available to
petitionet·s to determine their right, denied by the San Francisco registrar of voters, to submit a proposed initiative to the
electorate, where the superior court denied such a writ only
three weeks before the date by which the sufficiency of the
signatures had to be decided, and where an appeal from such
order would thus have been an inadequate remedy.
[2a, 2b] Municipal Corporations-Initiative-Scope of PowerRegistrar of Voters.-.Under the San Francisco Charter, the
right to propose initiative measures cannot properly be
impeded by a decision of a ministerial officer, even if
supported by the advice of the city attorney, that the subject
is not appropriate for submission to the voters, and the San
Francisco registrar of voters exceeded his authority, under
§ 180 of the charter, in undertaking to determine whether a
proposed initiative was within the power of the electorate to
adopt.
[Sa, Sb] Id.-Initiative-Scope of Power-Registrar of Voters.Under § 180 of the San Francisco Charter, the duty of the
registrar of voters is lintited to the ministerial function of
ascertaining whether the procedural requirements for submitting an initiative measure have been met, and if they have
been met, he must place it on the ballot unless he is directed
to do otherwise by a court on a compelling showing that a
proper case has been established for interfering with the
initiative power.
[4] Id.-lnitiative-Charter Provisions-Liberal Construction.Charter provisions dealing with the power of initiative by the
people must be liberally construea to promote the democratic
process.
[6] Id. - Initiative - Scope of Power - Resolution on Foreign
Policy.-Section 179 of the San Francisco Charter is not so
limited as to restrict initiative measures to those concerning
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Initiative, Referendum: and Recall, § 27;
Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations (1st ed § 208 et seq).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 77; [2, 3] Municipal
Corporations, § 253; [4] Municipal Corporations, § 252; [5]
Municipal Corporations, § 253(1).
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municipal affairs on which the board of supervisors could
enact binding legislation, and in the case of a resolution or
declaration of policy submitted for general vote at a municipal
election, urging a line of foreign policy contrary to that of the
federal government, the only limitation is the sufficiency of
signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel an acting registrar
of voters and a county clerk to determine the sufficiency of
signatures to a petition to place an initiative measure on the
ballot and, if determined to be sufficient, to place the proposed
initiative on the ballot. Peremptory writ granted.
Garry, Dreyfus, McTernan & Brotsky, Benjamin Dreyfus
... and Allan Brotsky for Petitioner.
Marshall W. Krause, M. Lawrence Popofsky and Paul N.
Halvonik as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Thomas M. 0 'Connor, City Attorney, and George E.
Kruger, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents.

()

TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioners have obtained the signatures
of more ·than 21,000 electors of the City and County of San
Francisco to a petition to place an initiative measure on the
ballot urging an immediate ceasefire and American withdrawal from Vietnam. Seeking submission of the measure to
the voters at the November 7, 1967, municipal election, petitioners tendered the signatures to the acting registrar of
voters. On the advice of the city attorney, the acting registrar
refused to determine the sufficiency of the signatures to
qualify the measure for the ballot. Petitioners then sought a
writ of mandate from the superior court. That court denied
relief on August 31, 1967. On September 5, petitioners filed a
petition for a writ of mandate in this court to compel the
acting registrar of voters and the county clerk to determine
the sufficiency of the signatures and to place the measure 011
the ballot.
[1] Petitioners allege that relief must be granted by Sept.ember 22, 1967, to permit the determination whether they
have sufficient signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot. Accordingly, they contend that an appeal from the
superior court's order is not an adequate remedy. Under these
circumstances they may invoke this court's original jurisdiction to determine their rig11t to submit the proposed initiative
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to the electorate despite the pendency of the superior court
action. (Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 87, 90-91 [207
P.2d 47].) 1
[2a] It must be noted at the outset that the acting registrar of voters exceeded his authority in undertaking to determine whether the proposed initiative was within the power of
the electorate to adopt. [Sa] Under section 180 of the
Charter of the City and County of San Francisco, his duty is
limited to the ministerial function of ascertaining whether the
procedural requirements for submitting an initiative measure
have been met. [2b] It is not his function to determine
whether a proposed initiative will be valid if enacted or
whether a proposed declaration of policy is one to which the
-initiative may apply. These questions may involve difficult legal
. issues that only a court can determine. The right to propose
initiative measures cannot properly be impeded by a decision
of a ministerial officer, even if supported by the advice of the
city attorney, that the subject is not appropriate for submission to the voters. [3b] Given compliance with the formal
requirements for submitting an initiative, the registrar must
place it on the ballot unless he is directed to do otherwise by a
court on a compelling showing that a proper case has been
established for interfering with the initiative power. (McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 330, 332 [196 P .2d 787].) In
Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558 [11 Cal.Rptr.
340], and Riedma·n v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383 [18 P.2d
947], such a showing was made, and the court therefore had
no occasion to consider whether an election official on his own
motion may refuse to submit an initiative measure to the
electorate on the ground that it deals with a matter not
subject to the initiative. Accordingly, neither case is contrary
to our conclusion herein. (See Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.
(1960) 54 Ca1.2d 339, 343 [5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575] ;
People v. Ba·nks (1959) 53 Ca1.2d 370, 389 [1 Cal. Rptr. 669,
348 P.2d 102].)
Since respondents in the present case, however, have
refused to proceed and seriously contend that the proposed
measure should not be submitted to the voters, we deem it
appropriate to determine whether the charter enables the electorate to adopt it.
IThe parties have stipUlated to' waive issuance of an alternative writ
or order to show cause and to submit the ease without oral argument
upon the petition and the memorandum of points and authorities in
opposition.
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The proposed measure is denominated a declaration of
policy. It provides that "It is the policy of the people of the
City and County of San Francisco that there be an immediate
ceasefire and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam so that
the Vietnamese people can settle their own problems. "
Section 179 of the charter provides: "The registered voters
shall have power to propose by petition, and to adopt or reject
at the polls, any ordinance, act or other measure which is
within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to
enact, or any legislative act which is within the power
conferred upon any other board, commission or officer to
adopt, or any amendment to the charter. . . .
" Any declaration of policy may be submitted to the electors
in the manner provided for the submission of ordinances; and
when approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting
on said declaration, it shall thereupon be the duty of the
board of supervisors to enact an ordinance or ordinances to
carry such policies or principles into effect, subject to the
referendum provisions of this charter. "
[4] This power of initiative must be liberally.construed
(Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 804, 809 [270 P.2d 481])
to promote the democratic process. (Mervywne v. Acker,
supra,' 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563.) [5] Despite this rule of
construction and the broad language of the charter, respondents contend that initiative measures cannot be submitted to
the electorate unless they concern municipal affairs on which
the board of supervisors could enact binding legislation. Section 179, however, is not so limited. It reserves to the people
the power to initiate "any ordinance, act or other measure
which is within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact. . . ." As representatives of local communities, boards of supervisors and city councils have traditionally
made declarations of policy on matters of concern to the
community whether or not they had power to effectuate such
declarations by binding legislation. Indeed, one of the purposes of local government is to represent its citizens before the
Congress, the Legislature, and administrative agencies in
matters over which the local government has no power. Even
in matters of foreign policy it is not uncommon for local
legislative bodies to make their positions known. By their
Resolution No. 34]-67, approved June 2, 1967, for exa.mple,
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors commended President
Jobnson "for his stand on the present Arab-Israeli crisis"
and urged "that all necessary action be taken to insure
freedom of navigation for all countries in the Gulf of
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Aqaba. " Pursuant to section 179 the people as well as their
elected representatives may adopt such resolutions.
Respondents contend, however, that petitioners' measure is
not a "resolution," but a "declaration of policy" governed
by the second paragraph of section 179. They urge that only
declarations of policy that can be put into effect by ordinances
can be adopted by initiative.
The second paragraph of section 179 neither restricts the
measures that may be submitted pursuant to the first paragraph nor limits the declarations of policy that it authorizes
by its own force. It does not expressly restrict the type of
declaration that may be submitted, but instead refers to
"any" declaration. The fact that the board's duty "to
carry . . . into effect" approved policies is inoperative when
the policy is beyond the power of the board to effectuate,
affords no basis for restricting the right to declare the policy.
Only by construing the paragraph narrowly against the power
of initiative could it be held that the voters may only declare
policies that the supervisors could effectuate by ordinance.
Even under such a narrow construction, however, the
. proposed initiative is authorized, for the board of supervisors
: can enact ordinances carrying out the policy of the declaration to express the popular will. The board by ordinance can
use the avenues of advocacy available to it to express that
will. It can, for example, direct its legislative representative
in Washington to make the people's position knowll, rename
streets or buildings, or order the posting of the declaration in
public bUildings.
The charter contains a numerical requirement as a built-in
safeguard against frivolous use of the initiative process. There
is no other limitation that prevents petitioners from submit~ing th{\ir measure to a general vote.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondents to determine the sufficiency of the signatures to the petition and, if determined to be sufficient, to place the proposed
initiative on the ballot for the municipal election of November
7,1967. This decision is final forthwith.
.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J.,
concurred.
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The obligation imposed upon the
judiciary of this countryl is to interpret and apply the
lConfirmed by the required oath of office (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 3).
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supreme law, or sovereign will of the people. Under this
distinctive American doctrine, termed "our greatest single
contribution to the cause of free government," the people
confided to the courts the responsibility to keep the power of
government, national, state and local, by whomsoever exerted
within the. orbit authoritatively prescribed. (1 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) § 1.96, pp. 357-358.)
This court's failure to uphold the responsible city officials
of the City and County of San Francisco in their refusal to
permit the machinery of local municipal elections to be used
to legislate 2 upon issues exclusively federal in nature is an
abdication of that responsibility.s
The formulation of policy with re~pect to the war in Vietnam is placed by the federal Constitution within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal government, in the Congress and
the President of the United States. It is to the federal govern.
ment and its responsible officials that the petitioners should
address their plea. 4
Chartered cities are created under the authority of article
XI, section 8, of the California Constitution, which specifies
in subdivision (j), that "It shall be competent in any charter
framed under the authority of this section to provide that the
municipality governed thereunder may make and enforce all
laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject
only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their
several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be
subject to general laws." (Italics added; see also § 6 of art.
XI.)5 The people of San Francisco have acknowledged this
constitutional limitation upon municipal authority by provid2A declaration of policy is an exercise of legislative power. (Simps01l.
v. Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 130 [3] [222 P.2d 225]; Kleiber v. Oity
etc. of San Francisco (1941) 18 Cal.2d 718, 722-723 [117 P.2d 657];
Hopping v. Oouncil of Oity of Richmond (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 614-617
[150 P. 977 J; see also Reagan v. Oity of Sausalito (1962) 210 Cal.
App.2d 618, 624 [4] [26 Cal.Rptr. 775].)
sWe are informed that an initiative petition of similar import seek· .
ing to force the voters of the City of New York to take an official posi.
tion against the war in Vietnam was denied filing by the city clerk upon
advice of the municipal corporation counsel.
4The First Amendment to the United .States Constitution guarantee.
to the people the right to petition the government.
5Section 6, in pertinent part: "Cities . . • hereafter organized under
charters framed and adopted by authority of this Constitution are hereby
empowered, and cities . . . heretofore organized by authority of this
Constitution may amend their charters . . • so as to become likewise
empowered hereunder, to make and enforce all laws and regulations in
respect to municipal affairs . .. and in respect to other matters they
shall be subject to and controlled by general laws." (Italics added.)
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ing in their charter (§ 2) that "The city and county may
make and enforce all laws, ordinances and regulations necessary, convenient or incidental to the exercise of all rights
and powers in respect to its affairs . .•. " (Italics added.)6
"Municipal affairs," as those words are used in the Constitution, "refer to the internal business affairs of a municipality." (City of Walnut Oreek v. Silveira (1957) 47 Ca1.2d
804, 811 [12] [306 P.2d 453] ; Fragley v. Phelan (1899) 126
Cal. 383, 387, 388 [58 P. 923] ; see also West Ooast Advertising 00. v. City &7 Oounty of San Francisco (1939) 14 Cal.2d
516, 521-524 [95 P.2d 138] ; Oity of Santa Monica v. Grubb
(1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 718 [54 Cal.Rptr. 210].) Thus in
discussing and clarifying the extent of the powers of
chartered cities under the constitutional grant, the court in
West Ooast emphasized frequently and at length the" municipal affairs" and "municipal purposes" aspects and restrictions. (See also Brougher v. Board of Public Works (1928)
205 Cal. 426, 437 [2] [271 P. 487] ; Oralle v. City of Eureka
(1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 808,811 [1] [289 P.2d 509].)
Concededly, the basic rule is that statutory or charter
provisions dealing with the power of initiative and referendum are to be liberally construed in favor thereof. (Gage v.
Jordan (1944) 23 Ca1.2d 794, 799 [1] [147 P.2d 387] ; Blotter
v. Farrell (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 804, 809 [3] [270 P.2d 481] ;
Hunt v. Mayor &7 Oouncil of Oity of Riverside (1948) 31
Ca1.2d 619,622-623 [1] [191 P.2d 426].) But no liberality of
construction, however indulgent, can contravene the express
constitutional restrictions limiting to municipal affairs the
initiative legislation which may be adopted by a chartered
city.
To focus our attention upon what is within the ambit of
"municipal affairs," McQuillin points out that "Modern city
government controls the things that touch the home and life
of the citizen, such as law and order, protection of life, limb
and property, safety on the streets and everywhere within the
corporate limits; protection from lawlessness, from traffic
danger, from fires; safeguard of health by necessary sanitation, pure water, food supplies, light, air, hospitals and scientific devices; and promoting morality. The way by which these
eWe find a further recognition of this limitation in the very paragrapbs of the cbarter upon which petitioners here rely. Section 179
expressly limits the use of the initiative and referendum to acts which
are' 'within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact"
(lr within the legislative power of any other board or officer.
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matters are originated and controlled is by the voters working
and cooperating together and with their public servants, and
speaking with judgment at the polls by their vote in choosing
officers and passing on measures." (1 McQuillin, :Municipal
Corporations (3d ed.) § 1.113, p. 413.)
Our court~ have not hesitated to compel or to approve omission from the ballot of measures plainly beyond the intent of
the people when they spoke in framing and adopting the
constitutional enactments reserving to themselves the power of
initiative and referendum. (See Simpson v. Hite, supra
(1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 133-134, and cases there cited; McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 330, 334 [4], 357 [196 P.2d
781] ; Hunt v. Mayor ({7 Oouncil of Oity of Riverside, supra·
(1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 628-629 [5]; Gage v. Jordan, supra
(1944) 23 Ca1.2d 794, 799-800 [1-4],804-807 [9] ; Mervynne v.
Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 565 [9b] [11 Cal.Rptr.
340].) Thus in Simpson, the principle was again emphasized
by a unanimous court that the people never intended that the
initiative or referendum apply where "the inevitable effect
would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of
some other governmp.ntal power, . . . " (P. 134 [6] of 36
Ca1.2d; see also Alexander v. Mitchell (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d
816,823-:-825 [7,8], 828 [14] [260 P.2d 261].)
It is contended that by the use in charter section 179 of the
phrase" declaration of policy" the people intended to reserve
to themsel~es a unique straw vote or poll-taking device not
common to other charters which somehow escapes the limitations of the state Constitution. Assuming such was the
purpose of the framers of the charter, it would be to no avail
because the limitations of the Constitution must control. The
Constitution is the measure of the power. 7
History shows that because of frequent disputes over the
basic policy involved in local legislative matters, governing
boards have upon occasion utilized the referendum to ascertain the will of the electorate upon the major policy decisions
involved. Once such decisions have been settled by popular
vote then the board has proceeded to implement such policy
by the enactment of whatever ordinances are necessary. (See
Hopping v. 001mcil of Oity of Richmond, supra (1915) 170
Cal. 605, 614-617.) It was to take advantage of this method of
ascertaining and carrying out the will of the people that the
framers of the San Francisco Charter adopted the provision in
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question. This purpose is clearly indicated by the express
provisions making it the duty of the board to enact the ordinances necessary to effectuate such policy decisions of the
people. If, as petitioners contend, these policy determining
procedures are not limited to municipal affairs then the
language imposing the duty upon the board of supervisors to
adopt the ordinances required to carry such policy into effect
is rendered meaningless. Such an interpretation is violative of
the fundamental rules of statutory construction.
Petitioners seek to avoid this pitfall by suggesting that if
the electorate adopts their proposed policy on the Vietnam
war the board of supervisors could implement such policy by
enacting ordinances, e.g.: to direct its legislative representative in Washington to make the people's position known; to
rename the War Memorial Opera House as the Immediate
Cease Fire Building; or to order the posting of the declaration in public buildings. These suggestions demonstrate that
petitioners were hard put to think of a single legislative act
the board of supervisors could enact to effectuate the policy.s
None of the suggested "ordinances" would qualify as anything more than administrative in nature. Hardly could they
be accorded the dignity of local legislation. To urge that such
method of propagandizing or of denigrating a point of view
would lend legality to the basic legislative objective is to
demonstrate that the policy declaration sought cannot qualify
as a" municipal aifair."
But, note the majority in today's opinion, boards of supervisors and city councils adopt resolutions on matters of
national concern, so why not the electorate of their cities?
Boards of supervisors and city councilmen are not "representatives of local communities" on matters outside the scope
of county and municipal affairs and certainly are not authorized in any representative capacity to express the will of the
people on matters of national policy. Congressmen are elected
to perform this function. Under the separation of powers
provided for by our state and federal Constitutions officials
elected to represent cities, towns and counties in local affairs
have no power whatever to commit or bind their local
citizenry on non-municipal affairs. But, asserts- the majority
opinion, "representatives of local communities" such as
boards of supervisors and city councils, have traditionally so
8Bection 13 of the charter requires that "every legislative act shall be
by ordinance."
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acted in making" declarations of policy on matters of concern
to the community whether or not they had power to e1iectuate
such declarations by binding legislation."9
Admittedly, in the enjoyment of the much cherished and
exercised American privilege of speaking out without
restraint, the minute books of such boards are replete with
recorded resolutions on every conceivable subject, but when
such actions transcend the constitutional powers of such a
board their pronouncements have no legal significance
whatever.
When the members of such a board act in this manner on
national issues they speak for themselves alone. Not one whit
of "representative capacity" is added by any number of
repetitions of such ultra vires acts. They remain the expressions of the individuals involved. Such expressions of sentiment are no more binding upon the people of the community
or upon the corporate entity itself than (ire the utterances of
any group in the town square. Why then are they allowed to
pass such resolutions, we might ask T Acceptance of public
office does not cut 01i a person's right of free speech. And
although from time to time someone may question the use of
public funds and facilitities to record the individual opinions
of supervisors on matters outside the scope of their duties and
responsibilities, the cost to the local treasury of the adoption
of such resolutions is minimal. The opinion of the city attorney is not asked and understandably is not volunteered on the
legality of expenditures for such purposes; and the "resolutions" make good news copy; hence, they continue unabated.
This court should not permit the past indulgence of boards in
such practices to be used as a justification for petitioners to
force the taxpayers of a city to finance the taking of a public
poll on a non-municipal subject.
We should face this problem squarely, as did the acting
registrar and the city attorney in this case. The use of the
election machinery of the city for any purpose involves a
substantial expenditure of public moneys. If petitioners can
force the use of the ballot at tl1e forthcoming regular munici.
pal election for this purpose, the next occasion could well
require the calling of a special municipal election to vote on
9Petitioners set forth a number of such "ordinances." However, an
examination of each demonstrates that not a single one was in fact an
ordinance. Each was a "resolution" of the board of the type discussed
here.
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such a measure,10 involving very substantial expenses. In
dealing with measures calling for the expenditure of public
moneys we must be mindful of their nature. Moneys raised
through the power of taxation are impressed with a public
trust to be used for lawful purposes. They are extracted from
rich and poor alike and often painfully from those scarcely
able to pay but doing so under the penalty of loss of property
through tax sale.
We must also weigh the effect of today's decision upon
other counties and cities, all of which enjoy the use of the
initiative and r~ferendum either by state statute or local
charter. The widespread abuse ()f the initiative as a polltaking device on non-municipal issues could cause the people,
in recoiling from the resulting expense, to drastically curtail
its use. Unabated, such abuse could destroy the concept of
local government as we have known it and as the framers of
our state and federal Constitutions conceived it.
There are in every community militant groups espousing
controversial causes of all kinds. History has demonstrated
that signatures to petitions can be obtained for almost any
conceivable purpose. It takes little imagination to name issues
which one or another group might desire to force to a! municipal vote:
That capital punishment be abolished;
That a state or federal officer be impeached;
That civil rights marches be declared unconstitutional and
participants jailed;
That private school systems be abolished;
That abortion laws be abrogated;
That schools be segregated;
That state universities be tuition free;
That this country should (or should not) bomb - - ;
That vivisection be a federal offense;
That the CIA be banned;
That the borders of the state be closed to persons of
(whatever category) ;
That this country wage war on - - ;
That daylight saving be abolished;
That Congress ban fluoridation;
That marijuana be legalized.
Not one of these issues is any further removed from munici10Seetion 182 of the charter.

)

336

FARLEY tI. HEALEY

[67 C.2d

pal affairs than the agonizing problem which is the concern of
the present petition. And what would be the ultimate effect of
such broadening of municipal elections Y Apart from the
illegality of such action, the injection of issues such as these
in municipal elections would so embroil the people of any
community "that worthy candidates for local office, seeking
election based upon their individual records of experience and
their platforms for municipal improvements, and perplexing
local issues requiring close public scrutiny and attention,
would be utterly lost in the confusion caused by the intrusion
of such highly volatile, non-municipal issues. The quality of
local government would greatly deteriorate in direct ratio to
this diversion from local problems. And who is to say that this
country can afford the slightest inattention to the awesome
issues which confront and even threaten to destroy the American city Qf today'
It is one thing to elect a state legislator, a Congressman, or
a President on the basis of his stand on state or national
issues, but it is quite another to judge the personal qualifications of a mayor, district attorney, assessor or supervisor
because of, his personal views on ballot propositions not
related to local government.
Petitioners contend and the majority opinion declares that
the acting registrar exceeded llis authority in undertaking to
determine whether the proposed initiative was within the
power of the electorate to adopt. These charges demonstrably
are without merit. Section 180 of the San Francisco Charter is
devoid of the limitations which the majority declare to be
found in the section. l l Instead, it specifies, inter alia, that

.,.'

llCharter section 180, in full:
"The filing, verification and certification of initiative, referendum and
recall petitions shall be in accordance with general law, and rules and
regulations of the registrar of voters relative to details not covered by
general law, except as otherwise provided by this charter. Any signer
to a petition may withdraw his name from the same by filing with the
registrar of voters a verified revocation of his signature before the filing
of the petition. No signature can be revoked after the petition has been
filed. Unless and until it be proven otherwise by official investigation by
the registrar, it shall be presumed that the petition filed conforms to all
legnl requirements and contains the signatures of the requisite number of
registered voters, and after an election based thereon, the sufficiency of
such petition shall not be questioned.
"If any signature be questioned, the registrar shall mail notice to
such purported signer, stating that his or her name is attached to such
petition and citing him or her to appear before said registrar forthwith,
naming the time and place. Said citation shall enclose a blank affidavit,
which may be used to deny that the affiant signed such petition. If such
'Person does not desire to attend in person, he may swear to such affidavit
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"Unless and until it be proven otherwise by official investigation by the registrar, it shall be presumed that the petition
filed conforms to all lega-l requirements and contains" sufficient qualified signatures. (Italics added.)
Moreover, section 173 of the charter in its first sentence tells
the registrar that "The conduct, management and control of
. . . the holding of elections, and of all matters pertain-ing to
eu.lctions in the city and county shall be vested exclusively"
in him. (Italics added.) Section 26 of the charter instructs the
city attorney to "give his advice or opinion in writing to any
ofiicer, board or commission of the city and county when
requested." The city attorney advised that the declaration
set forth in the proposed initiative measure may not properly
be placed on the ballot and that the registrar should refuse to
accept the petitions for filing in his office. Accordingly, the
registrar did so refuse.
That this is the accepted, customary and approved procedure by which responsible public officials attempt to determine and to carry out their duties in the premises is
demonstrated repeatedly by decisions of the appellate courts
of this state. 12 In Riednwn v. Br-ison (1933) 217 Cal. 383 (18
P.2d 947], now dismissed by the majority as having "had no
of denial before any officer authorized to take oaths, and mail the same
to the registrar. If he does not so attend and deny such signature in
pc-rson or by making and mailing such affidavit of denial before the
time when the registrar must, under general law, make final determination, the signature to such petition must be treated as genuine. The
registrar shall keep a list of the names of all purported signers who
appear before him and deny their signatures under oath, and also file
and keep such affidavits for at least one year."
12With respect to proposed initiative or referendum measures, see the
following: Housing Authority v. Superior Oourt (1950) 35 Cal.2d 550,
555 [219 P.2d 457], in which this court issued prohibition to halt mandamus proceedings by which it was sought to compel the city clerk of
Los Angeles to file a referendum petition ; Myers v. Stringham (1925)
195 Cal. 672, 673 [235 P. 448]; Dwyer v. Oity Oouncil (1927) 200 Cal.
505, 508-509 [253 P. 932]; Mervynne v. Acker, supra (1961) 189 Cal.
App.2d 558, 560, 562 [6]; Alexander v. Mitchell, supra (1953) 119 Cal.
App.2d 816, 818, 829 [16]; Hyde v. Wilde (1921) 51 Cal.App. 82, 85-86
[2] [196 P. 118]; Ohase v. Kalber (1915) 28 Cal.App. 561, 564 [153 P.
397]; Bennett v. Drullard (1915) 27 Cal.App. 180, 187 [149 P. 368];
see also Hunt v. Mayor ~ Oouncil of Oity of Riverside, supra (1948)
31 Ca1.2d 619, 621.
With respect to proposed municipal bond issues, see e.g. Oity of Walnut
Creek v. Silveira, supra (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 804, 807, and Oity of Oxnard
v. Dale (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 729, 731 [1] [290 P.2d 859], in both of which,
as in the present case, the duties of the local official were ministerial and
to be compelled by mandamus "if the proposed issue meets the requirements of the law," (found in Constitution and statutes) as to the purposes for which the bonds may issue and the revenue sources available
to pay them. (Italics added.)
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occasion to consider" the matter, this court in denying
mandamus to com.pel a city clerk to examine and certify an
initiat·ive petition, declared at the outset (p. 386 [1]) that
"the question is one of law relating to the jurisdiction of the
city clerk to act at all in this matter," and ruled (pp. 387388 [3]) that" The matter to which the petition in the hands
of the city clerk relates, not being a matter of municipal legislation, that official has no legal duty to perform in relation to
it under the cllarter." (Italics added.) McFadden v. Jordan,
supra (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 330, 332, cited by the majority in
support of their attack on the registrar, not only does not
discuss, much less support, the proposition for which it is
advanced, but instead briefly states that "Mandamus is a
proper remedy" to compel omission of a proposed initiative
measure from the ballot. These citations fully support the
responsible city officials in their actions here.
In conclusion, there is an understandable reluctance on the
part of judges to take any step which on its face may appear
to thwart the will of the electorate. It is especially so where,
as here, to act would frustrate the desires of an alleged 21,000
signers of the proposed initiative petition. In considering the
will of the electorate, however, we must recall that it was the
voters of the entire state who limited the legislative powers of
supervisors and of the local electorate. Consequently, in
holding this attempted legislative act invalid the court would
be declaring the sovereign will of the people of the state as a
whole. (1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) § 1.96,
p. 354.) Authorities in municipal government have listed as
one of the major defects of such governments in this country
the failure to separate national and state politics from local
issues in municipal elections and administration. (1 McQuillin, op. cit. supra, § 1.114, p. 416.) The decision of this court
today opens the door to compounding this defect a thousandfold.
The writ sought should be denied.
McComb, J., concurred.
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